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Abstract
This note emphasizes the special role of prospect theory in drawing psychophysical considerations into theories of decision making under risk. One such consideration is the dependence of outcome value on a reference point, and the increased sensitivity of loss relative to gain (“loss-aversion”). Loss-aversion can explain the St. Petersburg Paradox without requiring concave utility, has the right psychology, is theoretically useful, and is a parsimonious principle that can explain many puzzles. An open question is whether aversion to loss is a stable feature of preference, is an expression of fear, or has some other properties.  
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	Novemsky and Kahneman’s (2005) tour de force exploring the boundaries of loss-aversion is a reminder of the power of prospect theory in explaining how people value risks, and also a reminder of the delicacy required to sharpen and apply the model. 
The deep contribution of prospect theory was not only to introduce a parsimonious and fruitful alternative to expected utility theory. More importantly, prospect theory introduced a perceptual and psychophysical perspective to thinking about money, goods, and risk. Previous approaches, stemming from Ramsey, DeFinetti, Savage, and von Neumann and Morgenstern, constrained the functional forms integrating probability and evaluation with logical axioms—most powerfully, the independence axiom—rather than with psychophysical principles. But why should principles from logic, which is evolutionarily new and effortful, necessarily trump highly-evolved principles from perception and psychophysical evaluation as a basis for theory? The rise of normative axiomatic foundations as description is good applied mathematics, but potentially leads to bad psychology and biology. 
Besides privileging axiomatic logic over biological mechanism, economic theory further imposes the prejudice that the value of money is derived from what it can buy, rather than being a “primary reinforcer” which directly produces psychophysical sensation, and is only loosely coupled to forecasts about utility from goods the money will buy. 
The psychophysical perspective immediately injects the observation, common in hedonic psychology since at least Helson (1964), that adaptation to current circumstances creates a natural (and ever-shifting) point of reference. In receiving money and goods, reference-dependence naturally implies that people will not code receipts on an integrative scale (like the calculation of net worth across different wealth categories performed when you apply for a mortgage). Instead, receipts are naturally encoded, and responded to, as gains and losses from a reference point. So a pauper who wins $10 million in a lottery may be ecstatic with her staggering $10 million in net worth, while a dot-com tycoon whose $100 million paper fortune shrinks to only $10 million in a week may kill himself, distraught over having only a pathetic $10 million in net worth. 
	The gain-loss distinction derived from comparison to reference points is important in two ways: First, the psychophysical view strongly hints that a general principle of diminishing sensitivity to change works for both growing losses and growing gains, which implies convexity of disutility for losses, which in turn implies a preference for gambling in the domain of losses to “catch up” to the reference point. Behavioral ecologists are quick to point out that an animal which is starving should gamble on finding food (because the marginal utility of catching up is so great—live or die); and these instincts for switching risk-preference in the face of survival risk are probably deeply encoded in biological mechanism we share with other animals. Prospect theory suggests further that this instinct is overgeneralized to the case where the stakes are not death, but are merely a return to a reference point.  
	Second, the psychophysical view that invites a gain-loss distinction also allows the possibility that losses are more disliked than equal-sized gains are liked (loss-aversion). 
The purpose of this short essay is to remind readers of the power of loss-aversion as an expression of psychological mechanism, a theoretically-useful modeling device, and an empirical phenomenon. I’ll remind readers how loss-aversion upsets the orthodoxy of risk-aversion in economic theory (as embodied solely in concavity of outcome utility), present some evidence, and suggest some unanswered researchable questions about how loss-aversion works. 

Loss-aversion can explain the St. Petersburg Paradox 

I’ll first show the power of loss-aversion in resolving the St. Petersburg paradox, which is widely and falsely believed (from Bernoulli onward) to necessarily lead to a concept of locally concave utility for money (i.e., u’’(x)<0 everywhere).  Please appreciate the radicalism of this claim: Any economics teacher who uses the St. Petersburg paradox as a “proof” that utility is concave (and gives students low grades for not agreeing) is confusing the sufficiency of an explanation for its necessity. 
Consider the classic St. Petersburg gamble: A fair memoryless coin is flipped until a “heads” turns up. If the head is flipped on the n-th trial, the gamble pays $2n. The gamble therefore pays $2 with probability .5 (a head comes up right away), $4 with probability .25 (a tail, then the fateful head), $8 with probability .125, and so on. The expected value of the gamble is 1+1+1+.., repeated infinitely, so its expected value is infinite. But when asked how much they would pay to buy such a gamble, people routinely report sums around $20. (As Hacking (1980) wrote, "few of us would pay even $25 to enter such a game."). Bernoulli concluded from this (based on introspection) that the infinite sum of expected utilities of money outcomes could be finite—and reconcilable with a low buying price—if utility was sufficiently concave (i.e., u’’(x)<0). 
The first important feature of the problem is that very large sums simply can’t be paid out. Suppose the maximum payout is some sum X, and denote by M the maximum number of flips of tails which almost hits the payout limit (i.e., M=maxm ($2m<X), so $2m+1>X). Since $230 is around $1 billion, we will work with M around 30 or more.  
A statistical fact is that if you pay $20, the most likely outcome is that a head will come up quickly and you’ll lose money net of the price you paid (with probability .5+.25+.125+.0625=.9375; you have only a 7% chance of winning, though of course if you win, you might win big). This provides the germ of an explanation based on loss-aversion. 
A little algebra shows how low buying prices can be if people are loss-averse. Call the buying price P. Consider a piecewise-linear model in which the utility of net loss, $2n-P, is λ($2n-P) is negative and the utility of net gain is $2n-P if the net gain is positive. The factor λ is the coefficient of loss-aversion, which is thought to be around 2 for money gambles of this sort (see Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005). 
Now we can solve for a price P which makes a person just willing to buy the gamble for price P. If $2n<P<$2n+1, then payouts less than $2n are encoded as losses and payouts greater than $2n+1  are encoded as gains. But losses loom larger than gains. This means that with piecewise linear utility, the loss-averse expected value is 
Σk=1→n  λ($2k-P)(1/2)k +Σk=n+1→M  ($2k-P)(1/2)k . The first term is negative and the second term is positive. Some algebra reduces this to a maximum buying price (assuming the inequality restriction $2n<P<$2n+1) of P=[M-n+nλ]/[λ(1-(1/2)n)+(1/2)n(1-(1/2)M)]. 
For a loss-aversion coefficient of λ=2, if the maximum prize is around $1 billion (M around 30), then the maximum buying price is P*=$17.55; if the maximum is $1 trillion (M around 40) the price is P*=22.71.​[1]​ So the St. Petersburg paradox is not necessarily resolved uniquely by locally concave utility. Being more averse to losing than winning, and believing (sensibly) there is a maximum payout, can also explain the paradox without assuming concavity of utility. 
	By not anticipating the relative distaste for loss, and the power of this loss-aversion to explain his puzzle, Bernoulli made one error. He made another error by directing attention purely toward the evaluation of money consequences, rather than toward probabilities. My hunch is that statisticians of his time were enamored with the (relatively) new discovery of expectation. And so Bernoulli, too, was infatuated with the newly-normative appeal of attaching the correct probability to outcomes and did not seriously consider the possibility of nonlinear weighting of probabilities, as a behavioral principle. 
Yaari (1987) forcefully noted the duality of concavity of money utility and nonlinearity of probability weighting as equally-plausible explanations of risk-aversion. His intuition was that not caring that much about the value of consequences if you win a lot (concave u(x)), and not thinking you were likely to win a lot (underweighting p(win)) were dual explanations. Why should the concave u(x) explanation be privileged over underweighting of p(win)? 
Prospect theory suggests further interesting implications of overweighting low probabilities (viz., explaining gambling on unlikely wins, like lottery tickets, and demand for insurance only for catastrophic risks). But Kahneman and Tversky were careful to leave a gap in the published graph showing the π(p) function. (Their graph is probably the only deliberately-discontinuous function published in Econometrica—and with good reason.) The incompleteness of their graph when p is low is a question mark, allowing the possibility that low probabilities are either dismissed (presumably due to inattention) and set to zero, or greatly overweighted (e.g., see Prelec’s beautiful 1998 axiomatization). Whether low probabilities are ignored or overweighted presumably depends on cognitive considerations that remained to be fully specified by a more nuanced cognitive theory, which requires a theory of attention. If people simply dismiss the chance of winning huge sums (or think they won’t get paid, as encoded by the maximum payout limit implicit in M) that also helps explain low buying prices for St. Petersburg gambles without concavity of utility.  
The key point—a blindingly simple one—is that it is simply false that low prices for St. Petersburg gambles necessarily imply that utility is locally concave (assuming a finite maximum payout). If the puzzle is explaining modest buying prices that are lower than expected values, concave utility is sufficient but not necessary. Piecewise linear utility with loss-aversion is sufficient too. 

Decision isolation and loss-aversion
A crucial ingredient in empirical applications of loss-aversion is “decision isolation”, or “focusing illusion”, in which single decisions loom large even though they are included in a portfolio of stream of similar decisions.  If many small decisions are integrated into a portfolio of choices, or a broad temporal view—the way a gambler might view next year’s likely wins and losses, taken together—then the loss on any one gamble is likely to be offset by others, so aversion to losses is muted. Therefore, for loss-aversion to be a powerful empirical force requires not only aversion to loss, but also a narrow focus so that local losses are not blended with global gains. This theme emerges in the 10 field studies discussed by Camerer (2000), which show the power of loss-aversion (and other prospect theory features) for explaining substantial behaviors outside the lab.
	An example of loss-aversion which illustrated the importance of decision isolation, and is also illustrative in a literal sense, comes from my work with Eric Zhikang Chua on savings decisions (2004). We did experiments in which subjects received simulated income in each of 30 periods drawn from a right-skewed lognormal distribution (which means most income was modest, but in some periods income was very large). In each period they could choose how much to consume from their savings, which equaled previous savings plus current income; whatever they didn’t consume went into savings. Their experimental earnings were a concave function of utility from spending in each period, added up across each of the 30 periods and across 7 “reincarnated” lifetimes (to study learning across when the entire 30-period “life” was repeated over and over). Because income was random, optimal behavior required subjects to save a lot in early periods, to build up a “buffer stock” of savings in case future income was low. (Because utility was concave, having a very low consumption period if you ran short— akin to eating ramen noodles and sleeping in your car—was very bad in terms of experimental points.) 
	To make the problem even more challenging, the utility of current consumption in a lifetime depended upon previous consumption, incorporating a kind of “habit formation”. This setup means there is an “internality” (an internal within-person externality). Current consumption necessarily lowers the utility of future consumption, by raising the habit level. 
	The basic finding is that subjects learned relatively quickly to save a lot in early periods to build up a buffer stock and to limit the negative internality from their habit. But loss-aversion also shows up in a dramatic way. The utility function from current consumption in a period, adjusting for habit, is structured so that in low-income periods optimal behavior requires subjects to consume so little that their experimental utility is sometimes slightly negative (depending on whether their periodic income shock is low). But we found that even in these periods, subjects were apparently reluctant—judging from their behavior-- to type a number into the software that gave a negative per-period utility. This reluctance to incur a loss, even when it is optimal to do so, is illustrated by Figure 1. This is a scatterplot of actual per-period utilities (determined by how much they consume) on the y-axis, versus the optimal per-period utilities (between -50 and +50, n=13,701 observations) on the x-axis. 


Figure 1: Actual utility (y-axis) against optimal utility (x-axis) for n=13,701 period-by-period consumption decisions (with y- and x-axis values between -50 and +50 (Chua and  Camerer, 2004). The relatively few points in lower-left quadrant shows reluctance to accept period-by-period utility losses even when they are optimal (left half of the graph, where optimal period-by-period utility is negative).

Highly loss-averse subjects would show a large number of points in the top half of the graph—that is, they picked period-by-period consumption levels to be sure they did not show a negative number (a small loss in experimental earnings) on their screen for that period, even when the optimal per-period earnings were negative. The graph shows a dramatic “shelf” at actual utility of zero on the y-axis: Even when they should choose consumption levels which give slightly negative utility, because the optimal period-specific utility was negative (the bottom left quarter of the graph), they rarely did. Overall, they choose consumption levels which gave negative utility, when they should have, only 21% of the time. 
A jackknife regression of actual utility against optimal utility allows different slopes in the positive domain (the upper right quadrant of Figure 1) and the negative domain (the lower left quadrant of Figure 1), but forces those two segments to intersect at  the origin.​[2]​ The slope coefficients of such a regression are .86 in the positive domain and a flatter .33 in the negative domain. The ratio of these slopes is 2.86. This ratio is not a precise measure of the degree of loss-aversion, but it is surprisingly close to the ratio of 2 that has proved useful empirically in other applications, like Novemsky and Kahneman’s. Keep in mind that the scope and style of this experiment is far removed from Novemsky and Kahneman’s. The fact that a similar loss-sensitivity coefficient is derived from two very different experiments is an encouraging bit of evidence that similar quantitative degrees of loss-aversion can explain disparate phenomena, which is precisely the kind of parsimony we hope to in behavioral economics explanations that generalize economic models. Interesting loss-aversion evidence is popping up in many places nowadays—from experiments on double-marginalization (a phenomenon of interest to industrial marketers; Ho and Zhang, 2004, estimate a coefficient of 1.6), to studies of national trade policy (Tovar, 2004, a coefficient around two). 
A striking fact about the loss-aversion in our savings experiment is that each subject made 29 periodic consumption decisions, over 7 lifetimes. So their earnings were determined by 203 different piecemeal decisions.​[3]​ They could easily afford to absorb point losses on many decisions and still end up ahead. The fact that they are reluctant to do so (judging from Figure 1) means they are not only loss-averse (on an arbitrary utility scale)—they are myopically loss-averse to each of about 200 separate periods. They apparently just found it difficult to type in a consumption number that gave a negative utility in return, even though they knew well that hundreds of those numbers would be added up to determine their modest earnings from this two-hour experiment. 

Is loss-aversion an emotion, a mistake, or a preference? 
	An important open question about loss-aversion is whether it’s a judgment error or a genuine expression of preference. Disliking potential loss is a legitimate preference if, upon feeling loss, there is a substantial hedonic sensation which is either brief but very painful or long-lasting. But disliking a possible loss is a judgment error if losses are transitory. This opens an interesting question about whether loss-aversion is an emotional reaction, and whether it is a mistake (an overreaction) or a genuine component of preference.
	Some evidence suggests that people in an emotional state overestimate how long the state will last, which biases their decisions (the “projection bias” of Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003). Think about the hesitation before diving into a pool that will feel cold at first, but only for a minute or two. Or think about a teenager’s heart-pounding trepidation on asking his or her crush out on a date, an investment which might lead to a long, happy life. Diving and asking-out are not losses per se; they are examples of situations in which the brief transition utility from one state to another is highly emotional, and even though brief, may prevent a good long-run action.
	My intuition is that loss-aversion is often an exaggerated emotional fear reaction, an adapted response to the prospect of genuine damaging survival-threatening loss, which overreact to small losses in our (evolutionarily-new) long lives that are not truly life-threatening (cf. Loewenstein et al, 2001, who argue that “risk is feelings”). Many of the losses people fear most are not life-threatening, but there is no telling that to an emotional system overadapted to conveying fear signals.  People hate losing jobs, ending relationships, and delaying delivery of rewards, thought they rarely die from those “losses” or broken hearts.
	Speaking as a “neuroeconomist” (see Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, in press) the idea that loss-aversion is fear is a researchable topic, and a juicy one. Fear reactions are relatively well-understood in the brain—since fear reactions are similar across species, the “animal model” is a useful way to understand fear.  The idea that loss-aversion is greatest when there is a tight budget constraint (as noted by Novemsky and Kahneman) is gracefully interpreted in a fear-of-loss framework. The possibility that the degree of loss-aversion varies across categories might also reflect fear. Thinking of loss-aversion as fear also implies the possibility that inducing emotions can push around buying and selling prices or goods. 

Conclusion
	Novemsky and Kahneman make an important progress toward clarifying the nature of constraint (e.g., earmarked budgets) and reference points which are essential to a user-friendly theory in which loss-aversion can be used to make predictions. In this note I have used examples to argue—an argument familiar to prospect theory students--  that locating aversion to risk entirely in concavity of utility is a mistake. Sure, you can do economics by rooting risk attitudes entirely in concave utility, but doing so is like stubbornly watching television in black-and-white when you can watch in color, if you just flip a mental switch. 
I have also remarked upon a long-standing question—is loss-aversion truly a stable component of preference, or a judgment mistake, perhaps a fearful overreaction to transitory loss? The answer is crucial to thinking about policy, regulation and law. Of course, aversion to losses might be either in different circumstances. Big recent and expected advances in studying emotions and neuroscience will help us answer these deep questions.  
	


References

Camerer, C. F.  (2000).  Prospect theory in the wild: Evidence from the field.  In D. Kahneman & A. Tversky (eds.), Choices, values, and frames (pp. 288-300).  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  

Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2005).  Neuroeconomics: How neuroscience can inform economics.  Journal of Economic Perspectives, in press.

Chua, Eric Zhikang and Colin Camerer. (2003) Experiments on Intertemporal Consumption with Habit Formation and Social Learning. Caltech working paper. 
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/savingsjpe7.doc
Hacking, Ian: 1980, ‘Strange Expectations’, Philosophy of Science 47, 562-567. 
Helson, H.  (1964).   Adaptation level theory:  An experimental and systematic approach to behavior.  New York: Harper & Row.

Ho, Teck and Juanjuan Zhang. (2004) Experimental tests of solutions to the double-marginalization problem: A reference-dependent approach. Haas School Berkeley working paper, 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hoteck/PAPERS/DMPALL.pdf
Prelec, Drazen. 1998. The decision weighting function. Econometrica, 66, 497--527.

Loewenstein, G., O'Donoghue T. & Rabin, M.  (2003).  Projection bias in the prediction of future utility.  Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Loewenstein, George F.; Weber, Elke U.; Hsee, Christopher K. and Welch, Ned. "Risk as feelings." Psychological Bulletin, 2001, 127(2), pp. 267-86.

Novemsky, Nathan and Daniel Kahneman. (2005). Boundaries of loss aversion. Journal of Marketing Research, in press. 

Tovar, Patricia. (2004). The Effects of Loss Aversion on Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence. University of Maryland job market paper. 

Yaari, Menahem E. The dual theory of choice under risk. Econometrica, 1987, 55, 95-115.	





PAGE  



12



^1	  A higher loss-aversion coefficient of λ=3 reduces these prices to $13.10 and $16.70. A loss-aversion coefficient of λ=1 (risk-neutrality) produces P*=M  (expected value pricing). 
^2	  It would be interesting to know if the piecewise slopes vary across the experiment, as subjects learn. This has not been tested yet. 
^3	  The period 30 was the last one, so the software automatically consumed all their savings in that period. So they did not make a decision in that last period, which is why only 29 periods are counted.
